Governance

Audit Committee and Supervisory Board Oversight for Public Interest Entities

20 November 2026

Public Interest Entities (PIEs) include credit institutions, insurance undertakings and companies whose securities are admitted to trading on an EU regulated market, together with entities designated by Member States. Their audits fall under Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 and the Audit Directive, as transposed into national law and supervised by oversight bodies such as CyPAOA in Cyprus and the AFM in the Netherlands.

Effective oversight of the external audit depends on a clear division of responsibilities. In a one-tier board structure, an audit committee of the board normally leads this work. In a two-tier structure, the supervisory board oversees the management board and may delegate detailed audit oversight to its audit committee. The precise allocation of duties depends on national company law, the entity’s articles and any applicable listing or sector rules.

Management remains responsible for preparing the financial statements and for maintaining effective internal control. Those charged with governance oversee that process, while the external auditor independently obtains evidence and expresses an opinion. Neither the audit committee nor the supervisory board assumes management’s responsibilities, and oversight should never compromise the auditor’s independence or professional judgement.

The core oversight agenda covers the integrity of financial reporting, the effectiveness of internal control and risk management, the work of any internal audit function, and the statutory audit. For Public Interest Entities, the EU Audit Regulation and Audit Directive add specific requirements. The audit committee must submit a recommendation for auditor selection containing at least two choices and a duly justified preference; the appointment itself is made by the body designated under national law.

Mandatory audit firm rotation limits an engagement to a maximum of ten years under the EU baseline, subject to Member State options, followed by a cooling-off period. The audit committee and supervisory board should plan any tender well ahead of the rotation deadline — typically 18 to 24 months — so that independence restrictions and firm capacity do not unnecessarily narrow the field.

Before fieldwork begins, the committee should discuss the proposed scope, timetable, materiality approach, engagement resources and use of specialists. For groups, the discussion should include component auditor involvement and the group auditor’s direction, supervision and review. Significant risks, fraud risks, going-concern issues and complex estimates deserve particular attention. The committee can challenge whether the plan responds to the entity’s risks, but it should not direct individual audit procedures.

Communication should continue throughout the engagement rather than being confined to the signing meeting. Under ISA 260 (Revised), auditors communicate significant matters with those charged with governance; ISA 265 addresses significant deficiencies in internal control. Useful agenda items include critical accounting policies, difficult judgements and estimates, corrected and uncorrected misstatements, disagreements with management, related-party matters, suspected fraud or non-compliance, and going-concern conclusions. For PIE audits, the Additional Report to the audit committee under Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 provides an enhanced basis for this dialogue.

Independence requires active monitoring. The committee should understand the auditor’s relationships with the entity and its group, review proposed non-audit services before approval, and consider whether fees or other interests could create threats to objectivity. For PIEs, prohibited services and the 70% fee cap for permitted non-audit services must be controlled under the applicable national implementation. A private session with the engagement partner, without management present, allows candid discussion of audit quality, management cooperation and unresolved concerns.

Audit quality is best assessed through evidence rather than fee alone. Relevant indicators include the involvement of the engagement partner and experienced staff, sector and technical expertise, the quality of challenge applied to management, consultation on difficult matters, engagement quality review where required, regulatory inspection outcomes and the firm’s transparency reporting. Timeliness matters, but accelerated reporting should not come at the expense of sufficient appropriate audit evidence.

The supervisory board should ensure that its audit committee has direct access to the external auditor and receives complete, timely information. It should consider the audit committee’s report, review significant findings and management’s responses, and monitor agreed actions to completion. Where the full supervisory board retains responsibility for approving the financial statements or recommending the auditor, its minutes should demonstrate informed consideration rather than a purely formal endorsement.

A practical annual cycle includes four checkpoints: approve the oversight plan and auditor independence before appointment or reappointment; challenge the audit plan before fieldwork; review significant findings, the draft audit report and management letter before approval of the financial statements; and evaluate auditor performance and outstanding actions after completion. Keeping a rolling action log helps prevent important matters from disappearing between meetings.

The strongest oversight combines constructive challenge with respect for distinct roles. Management prepares, the auditor independently assures, and the audit committee and supervisory board oversee. Because detailed requirements differ between Cyprus, the Netherlands and other EU Member States, boards should confirm the rules applicable to their own entity and document how their procedures address them.